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The Interplay Between Property Law and
Constitutional Law: How the Government

(Un)constitutionally "Takes" Land Dirt
Cheap
Kimberly A. Selemba*
I.

Introduction

The doctrines of adverse possession and easement by prescription
are well-settled areas of property law that are useful in resolving disputes
regarding ownership of real property.' They are unique, and may seem
strange, because they allow a "trespasser" to gain legal title to another's
land merely by occupying the true owner's property for a requisite period
of time and treating it as the true owner would.2 Title by adverse
possession or prescriptive easement may seem analogous to theft or
robbery, allowing a possessor to gain legal title to land without paying
for it. 3 Despite their inherent peculiarity, however, adverse possession
and easement by prescription have long been recognized as legal and
valid means of acquiring title to real property.4
There is a unique spin on adverse possession and prescriptive
easement when the possessor is a governmental entity. Unlike a private
person, a government entity is bound by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 It is currently unclear,
however, whether a state that acquires property through adverse
possession and/or prescriptive easement triggers the Takings Clause in
either the United States Constitution or similar takings provisions in
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
2004.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 1122, 1122 (1984).
2. Barry J. Kusinitz, Adverse Possession and Easements, R.I. B.J., Feb. 1999, at 5.
3. Id.
4. Merrill, supra note 1, at 1122.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
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individual state constitutions, and is therefore required to compensate the
private property owner.6
There are two prevailing views on this issue. The first view holds
that the state does not need to compensate the private property owner
after the requisite time period for adverse possession or easement by
prescription has run because the state is not "taking" property when it
acquires it through adverse possession or easement by prescription.' The
courts advocating this theory have reasoned that property owners are
time-barred from bringing a takings claim if they fail to bring it within
the statutory period for adverse possession or easement by prescription. 8
The second view holds that the state must compensate the private
property owner when it acquires property either through adverse
possession or easement by prescription, despite the fact that the
prescriptive period has run. 9 According to this view, the state is taking
property in violation of the Takings Clause.' 0 This Comment suggests
that the second view should prevail in order to uphold the principles of
equity and justice.
Part II of this Comment reviews the requisite elements needed to
establish legal title by adverse possession and easement by prescription.
Part II also reviews the elements of a taking, and the state actions the
United States Supreme Court has held definitively constitute a taking in
violation of the Takings Clause. Part III demonstrates why the District
Court of Rhode Island in Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island1
was correct in holding that a state must compensate the private property
owner after acquiring land by adverse possession and/or easement by
prescription. Specifically, the analysis emphasizes that the government
is different from a private individual because it is bound by the Takings
Clause of the Constitution and, as a result, must compensate the owner
when it acquires property for public use, no matter how it acquires title in
the land.
The analysis in Part III also stresses that a private property owner
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711
(Ky. 1966); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592 (Me. 2001); Rogers v. Marlin, 754
So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215
N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974); A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 1985);
City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Reitsma v. Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67
(Wash. 1980).
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. R.I.
2002); Johnson III v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
10. See sources cited supra note 9.

11.

217 F. Supp. 2d 206.
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cannot bring a takings claim until the prescriptive period for adverse
possession or prescriptive easement has run because it is only then that
the state acquires title to the land. As a result, the courts that advocate
the first view misinterpret the relationship between adverse
possession/prescriptive easement and the Takings Clause when they hold
that a property owner waives the right to bring a takings claim if not
brought within the requisite prescriptive period.
This Comment concludes, in Part IV, that although Pascoag is one
of the few cases that holds that a state must compensate a private
property owner after it acquires property by adverse possession or
prescriptive easement, Pascoag contains solid reasoning that is likely to
influence other courts in the near future.
II.

Background

A. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is a method of acquiring title to real property by
possession for a statutory period under certain conditions.1 2 There are
several possible justifications for allowing adverse possession. First,
adverse possession quiets all titles to property; it extinguishes old claims
to property while simultaneously reducing information and transaction
costs inherent in complicated title searches. 13
Second, adverse
possession punishes true owners for sleeping on their property rights, and
thus acts as a penalty to deter property owners from ignoring their
property.' 4 Finally, adverse possession is justified because it allows the
entitlement to be transferred to the adverse possessor who may have
developed reliance interests through longstanding possession of the
property.' 5
The acquisition of real property by adverse possession is largely
governed by individual state legislation. 6 Most states have similar
elements for adverse possession, with only small variations.' 7 Because
12.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (7th ed. 1999).

13.

See Kusinitz, supra note 2, at 5; Merrill, supra note 1, at 1129.

14.

Merrill, supranote 1,at 1130.

15. Id. at 1131.
16. Kusinitz, supranote 2, at 5.
17. See Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman P'shp, 733 A.2d 984, 989 (Me. 1999) ("A
party claiming title by adverse possession pursuant to the common law must prove...
that its possession and use of the property were: (1) actual; (2) open; (3) visible; (4)
notorious; (5) hostile; (6) under a claim of right; (7) continuous; (8) exclusive; and (9) of
a duration exceeding the twenty-year limitations period."); Grace v. Koch, 692 N.E.2d
1009, 1011 (Ohio 1998) ("To acquire title by adverse possession, the party claiming title
must show exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for a
period of twenty-one years."); Baylor v. Soska, 658 A.2d 743, 744 (Pa. 1995) ("[O]ne
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Rhode Island is the focus of the current controversy over whether a state
that acquires land by adverse possession triggers the Takings Clause, the
elements of adverse possession, as they are applied in Rhode Island,
must be considered here.
The statutory period for establishing title by adverse possession in
Rhode Island is ten years. 18 During the ten-year prescriptive period, the
claimant's possession must be "actual, open, notorious, hostile, under
claim of right, continuous, and exclusive." 19 "Exclusivity" and "claim of
right" are both satisfied if the adverse possessor cares for the property in
dispute by making continuous improvements on the land while the true
owner disregards the land and only walks across it.20 To satisfy the
"openness" requirement, it is sufficient for the adverse possessor to go
upon the disputed land and use it adversely to the true owner. 2 The true
owner is then chargeable with knowledge of the adverse possession.22
"Hostility" requires the claimant to engage in an action that is
"inconsistent with the claims of others., 23 Thus, an adverse possessor is
hostile if he or she continuously asserts dominion over the true owner's
property for the requisite statutory period.24 Finally, the test for "actual"
and "continuous" possession is "whether the use to which the land has
been put is similar to that which would ordinarily be made of like land by
the owners thereof., 25 The ultimate test to be satisfied in an adverse
possession claim is that "the claimant has acted toward the land in
question 'as would an average owner,
taking properly into account the
26
land."'
th[e]
of
nature
geophysical
Under Rhode Island law, a state may acquire property by adverse
possession if it satisfies the elements of adverse possession listed
above.2 7 Although these elements are specific to Rhode Island's law of
adverse possession, many other states' adverse possession claims involve
similar elements, with only small variations.28
who claims title by adverse possession must prove actual, continuous, exclusive, visible,
notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years.").
18. Lee v. Raymond, 456 A.2d 1179, 1182 (R.I. 1983).
19. Id.
20. Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1982).
21. Id.at 367.
22. Id.
23. Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183.
24. Id.
25. Id.(citing Russo v. Steams Farms Realty, Inc., 367 A.2d 714, 717 (R.I. 1977)).
26. Gammons, 447 A.2d at 368 (citing 7 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§1018, at 740 (1981)).
27. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (D.
R.I. 2002); see also Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.1. 2001)
(stating that a state acquires title by adverse possession).
28. See Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman P'shp, 733 A.2d 984, 989 (Me. 1999) ("A
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Easement by Prescription

The elements necessary to establish an easement by prescription in
Rhode Island are very similar to those needed to establish a valid adverse
possession claim. 29 The one significant difference is that the claimant of
an easement by prescription does not have to demonstrate exclusive
possession of the true owner's land. 30 "This is because easements are
concerned with 'use' not 'possession. ' ' 31 Thus, in order to obtain an
easement by prescription in Rhode Island, one must establish "actual,
open, notorious, hostile and continuous use under a claim of right for ten
years. 3 2 Rhode Island's elements of easement by prescription are
generally similar to the elements in other jurisdictions.3 3
C.

Takings

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prevents the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.34
Although the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, the
Takings Clause applies to the states by virtue of its incorporation into the

party claiming title by adverse possession pursuant to the common law must prove ...
that its possession and use of the property were: (1) actual; (2) open; (3) visible; (4)
notorious; (5) hostile; (6) under a claim of right; (7) continuous; (8) exclusive; and (9) of
a duration exceeding the twenty-year limitations period."); Grace v. Koch, 692 N.E.2d
1009, 1011 (Ohio 1998) ("To acquire title by adverse possession, the party claiming title
must show exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for a
period of twenty-one years."); Baylor v. Soska, 658 A.2d 743, 744 (Pa. 1995) ("[O]ne
who claims title by adverse possession must prove actual, continuous, exclusive, visible,
notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years.").
29. Kusinitz, supra note 2, at 32.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 831.
33. See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Alaska 1993) ("To establish a
prescriptive easement a party must prove that (1) the use of the easement was continuous
and uninterrupted; (2) the user acted as if he or she were the owner and not merely one
acting with the permission of the owner; and (3) the use was reasonably visible to the
record owner."); Bd.of County Comm'rs v.Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 980 (Colo. 1984)
(listing prescriptive easement elements in Colorado as using property under a claim of
right in a manner adverse to the landowner's property interest, without interruption for
the statutory period of twenty years, with the landowner having actual or implied
knowledge of the public's use of the road while making no objection to such use);
Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592, 601 (Me. 2001) ("The party asserting an
easement by prescription must prove continuous use for 'at least twenty years under a
claim of right adverse to the owner, with his knowledge and acquiescence, or a use so
open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be
presumed."'); Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267, 1272 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (listing
elements of an easement by prescription in Mississippi as open, hostile, under claim of
ownership, exclusive, peaceful, and uninterrupted for ten years).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Fourteenth Amendment.3 5
There are generally two types of takings that require the government
to provide just compensation to a private property owner: the taking of
property by the government's eminent domain power and the taking of
property by inverse condemnation. 36 Eminent domain, an inherent
sovereign power of the government, "allows the government to take
private property, for the benefit of the public, when compensation is
paid., 37 "Inverse condemnation occurs when government regulation, in
effect, condemns some or all of the use of the property, diminishing the
value to its owners to such
an extent that it is as if the government had
38
condemned the property.
The United States Supreme Court has identified two types of per se
takings where compensation is mandated: when "governmental action
has resulted in a permanent physical occupation of the property, ' 39 and
when "governmental regulation denies the owner of virtually all
economically beneficial use of the property. 4 0 Permanent physical
occupation of another's property is a serious invasion of an owner's
property interests .4a The government does not merely interfere with the
property owner's bundle of ownership rights; it "chops through the
bundle, taking a slice of every strand. A2 When the government
physically occupies another's property, the owner effectively loses the
right to possess, exclude, dispose, and control the use of the property. 3
Thus, when the government physically occupies another's
land for public
44
use, it must generally pay the owner just compensation.
The other per se taking occurs when governmental action denies the
property owner all economically beneficial use of the property.4 5 The
rationale for requiring the government to compensate private property
owners when its action deprives the owner of all economically beneficial
use is to prevent private property from being "pressed into some form of
46
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."
Thus, when the state engages in this type of action, it must compensate
35. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
36. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217 (D.
R.I. 2002).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 219 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 441 (1982)).
40. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
41. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
42. Id.
43. Id at 435-46.
44. Id.
45. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
46. Id. at 1018.
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the property owner unless the state action on the land is part of the state's
background principles of property and nuisance law.47
D. Takings Analysis Applied to Adverse Possession andEasement by
Prescription

It is undisputed that a state may acquire property through adverse
possession and easement by prescription. 8 However, there is a dispute
regarding whether a state that successfully acquires property through
those means violates the Takings Clause if the owner is not compensated
for the loss of land. 49 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, with the
support of many other state supreme courts, 50 has held that when a state
acquires property by adverse possession or prescriptive easement, it does
not have to compensate the property owner if the property owner does
not bring a takings claim within the ten-year statutory period allotted for
adverse possession and prescriptive easements.i In the recent Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island decision, however, the District Court
of Rhode Island held that a valid takings claim can be brought, even after

47. Id.at 1029. What is meant by the state's background principles of property and
nuisance law is that a law must "do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons)
under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complimentary power
to abate nuisances that affect the public generally." Id.
48. Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. 1966) ("[S]tates and
other governmental entities may acquire title [by adverse possession] the same as any
other person."); A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985)
("The prevailing view is that public or governmental entities may acquire title to land by
adverse possession."); Johnson III v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985) (stating that a governmental entity may acquire title to property by
adverse possession); Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826, 829 (R.I.
2001) ("[L]ike private parties, the government itself can acquire an easement by
prescription or title by adverse possession over property that was otherwise privately
owned during the period of the taking."); see Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island,
217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (D. R.I. 2002) ("Under Rhode Island law, the State may acquire
title by adverse possession or prescription.").
49. See Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22 (plaintiff alleged a sufficient takings
claim when the State acquired title to land by adverse possession and easement by
prescription). But see Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 837-38 (a takings claim does not exist when
the State acquired property by adverse possession and easement by prescription).
50. See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984); Stephens, 407 S.W.2d at 711; Stickney v. City of
Saco, 770 A.2d 592 (Me. 2001); Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974); A.A.A.
Invs., 478 N.E.2d at 773; City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1975);
Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 826; Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67 (Wash. 1980).
51. See Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 829 (holding that the state government can
involuntarily divest owners of private property other than by eminent domain or by
condemnation because "the government itself can acquire ... title by adverse possession
over property that was otherwise privately owned during the period of the taking").
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the requisite prescriptive periods have run, because the state takes the
property in violation of the Takings Clause of both the United States and
Rhode Island Constitutions.52 This Comment 53argues that the District
Court of Rhode Island was correct in its holding.
III. Analysis
A.

The Issue: Must a State Compensate a PrivateProperty Owner
When It Acquires Property by Adverse Possession?

Does a state that acquires property by adverse possession or
prescriptive easement trigger the Takings Clause, therefore requiring the
state to compensate the private property owner for the "taken" land?
Does it matter if the adverse possessor is a governmental entity or merely
a private person? Are the Takings Clause and the doctrine of adverse
possession mutually exclusive, or are they necessarily interrelated?
These questions are at the center of the current debate over the
application of the Takings Clause to a government's "taking" by adverse
possession or prescriptive easement.
In Pascoag, the District Court of Rhode Island answered these
questions by holding that a state must compensate a private property
owner when it acquires a portion of land by adverse possession or
prescriptive easement. 54 The Pascoag court stressed that the Takings
Clause and the doctrine of adverse possession are not mutually exclusive
because the state must always adhere to the mandates of the United
States Constitution.55 The Pascoag court is correct in applying this
analysis to conclude that the state triggers the Takings Clause when it
acquires legal title to land by adverse possession and easement by
prescription.5 6

52. R.I. CONST. art. I §§ 2,16; Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 222.
53. Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209. Although the Pascoag court held that the
plaintiff had alleged a takings claim against the State of Rhode Island, the plaintiffs
claim was too stale to warrant prosecution against the state because the plaintiffs claim
was asserted twenty-six years after the taking. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id. ("In property law, it is a straightforward proposition that, under certain
conditions, title to property may, by operation of law, be transferred to another without
compensation.
In constitutional law, it is a straightforward proposition that the
government cannot take private property without just compensation."). These two areas
of the law are not mutually exclusive. See id. ("Any state statute must adhere to the
requirements of the United States Constitution.").
56. Id.
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B. Background and Facts of Dispute
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Reitsma v. PascoagReservoir
& Dam,57 and the District Court of Rhode Island in Pascoag,58
considered the same facts. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, was the title
owner of Pascoag Reservoir at the time of the state's adverse possession
and prescriptive easement.5 9 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam's predecessors
in title created the Reservoir and had held title to it since 1860.60 In
1965, the State of Rhode Island constructed a boat ramp into the
Reservoir, which was continuously used by members of the general
public to access the lake. 6' Pascoag Reservoir & Dam acquired fee
simple title to the Reservoir from its predecessors in 1995.62 In 1997, the
State claimed it had acquired a portion of the Reservoir by adverse
possession and, on behalf of the public, a prescriptive easement to use
the boat ramp to access the Reservoir for recreational purposes.63
Pascoag counterclaimed alleging inverse condemnation and trespass.64
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island "held that the State had
acquired portions of the Reservoir bottom by adverse possession and...
a prescriptive easement to use the boat ramp to obtain access to the
Reservoir for recreational purposes. 65 It reasoned that the State began
to use the Reservoir property in 1965 and, under the Rhode Island tenyear adverse possession statute, had acquired title to a portion of the
Reservoir in 1975.66

In Pascoag, the District Court of Rhode Island agreed with the
conclusion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Reitsma; the State had
acquired the reservoir property by adverse possession and prescriptive
easement.67 The two courts differed, however, on the consequences of
the State acquiring title to land by these means. 68 Although the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island did not explicitly rule on Pascoag's inverse
condemnation claim, it implied that Pascoag would not have a valid
claim for just compensation. 69 The District Court of Rhode Island, on
57.
58.

See Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001).
See Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 206.

59.

Id.at 210.

60.
61.
62.
63.
2001)).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 210-11.
Id.at211.
Id.
Id.(citing Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.I.
Id.
Id.(citing Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 838).
Id.(citing Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 838).
Id. at 213.
Id.
See Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 837 (claiming that Pascoag's inverse compensation
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the other hand, ruled that Pascoag alleged a sufficient takings claim
because the state acquired portions of its property by adverse possession
and easement by prescription.7 °
C. Pascoag and Reitsma: Conflicting Interpretationsof a State's
Obligations When It Acquires Private Property Through Adverse
Possession or PrescriptiveEasement
The Pascoag court used a well-reasoned analysis to support its
conclusion that a state acquiring property by adverse possession and
prescriptive easement triggers the Takings Clause even after the
prescriptive period is complete. 71 The opinion makes compelling
arguments to refute the theory that a state does not need to compensate
the private property owner after the prescriptive periods for adverse
possession and prescriptive easement have run.72 This section will first
discuss the Pascoag court's explanation of why Pascoag Reservoir &
Dam could successfully have brought a takings claim, and will then
address the Pascoagcourt's reasons for holding that the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island, along with various other state court jurisdictions,
misinterpreted the application of the Takings Clause to claims of adverse
possession and easements by prescription.

claims against the state constructing a boat ramp into the reservoir "long ago would have
lapsed because of the [prior] owners' failure to initiate a timely action . . . and because of
their failure otherwise to interpose a timely objection to the state's conduct before the
prescriptive ten-year period expired."). Interestingly, however, the court seems to
contradict its implication that there would be no valid takings claim:
[E]ven if the state's conduct from 1965 to 1975 had been unlawful and
amounted to an improper taking ... without paying just compensation, and
even if the ...property had not been taken ... until the prescriptive period
ended in 1975 ... the corporation and its predecessors failed to assert any
takings claim in a timely manner.
Id. at 838 (emphasis added). The effect of the court's dicta was described by the plaintiff
as follows:
These judicial musings implicitly reject the State's position that the takings
action was automatically time-barred upon expiration of the prescriptive period
....
Thus, if anything, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejects the State's
virtually nonsensical position that, the landowner has ipsofacto lost his right to
just compensation at the very same moment when the State has acquired the
landowner's property by prescription.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Its Objection to Defendant's Motion To Dismiss
at 10, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. R.I. 2002)
(No. C.A. 01-505L).
70. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (concluding that although Pascoag has alleged a
sufficient takings claim, other principles, such as the statute of limitations, barred
Pascoag's successful takings claim).
71. Id. at 224.
72. Id. at 224-26.
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1. A Valid Takings Claim Exists When a State Acquires Property
by Adverse Possession
The Pascoag court recognized that the State of Rhode Island
acquired title to a portion of the bottom of the Reservoir.73 The State did
not use its eminent domain power, but rather acquired rights in the
property by adverse possession. 74 Adverse possession is a "species of
inverse condemnation;" as a result, the State, by utilizing the adverse
possession statute to gain title to a portion of Pascoag's reservoir, "has
condemned the property as if it had been taken by eminent domain. 75
When a government entity acquires private property through eminent
domain, it is required to pay just compensation to the private property
owner under the Takings Clause.76 Because the court likened a state's
action of acquiring property through adverse possession to a state's
eminent domain power, the court reasoned that Pascoag alleged a
sufficient takings claim against the State.77
The Pascoagcourt also reasoned: "When the state acquires title in
fee simple to land, without compensation, it engages in a permanent
physical occupation of property of the highest order." 78 Essentially, the
state does not just interfere with a private person's bundle of property
rights; it "severs the entire bundle." 79 The property owner not only loses
the right to possess and use the property, but also the right to exclude,
dispose of, and control the use of the land.80 Because the state is the
adverse possessor, and not a private individual who is free from the
constraints of the Takings Clause, the property owner, who is deprived of
the bundle of rights inherent in ownership of real property, is able to
allege a sufficient claim under the Takings Clause. 81
Furthermore, not only does the government engage in a permanent
physical occupation of land when it acquires property through adverse
possession or prescriptive easement, but it also wipes out all of the
landowner's economically beneficial use of the land.8 2 Because the
public now has unobstructed access to the Reservoir by way of the stateconstructed boat ramp located on Pascoag's property, the private
73. Id.at 221.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 221-22.
80. Id.at 222; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 435 (1982).
81.

Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 222.

82.

Id.at 222; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:2

landowner, because of the State's actions, is forced to provide
unrestricted use of the private property to the public. 83 This is a classic
example of a takings claim in which 84a state must provide just
compensation to the private property owner.
2.
The State Supreme Courts' Misinterpretation
Application of the Takings Clause to Adverse Possession

of the

The Pascoag court makes additional arguments that analyze why
numerous state supreme courts, when confronted with this precise issue
in the past, misinterpreted the Takings Clause in its application to
adverse possession and easement by prescription.85 In many of those
decisions, the state courts held that the party was precluded from
bringing the takings claim after the statutory period for adverse
possession or prescriptive easement had been completed, although the
party could have brought a takings claim prior to the end of that statutory
period.8 6 The Pascoag court confronted each of those decisions and
analysis of the interplay between property
condemned the state courts'
87
law.
constitutional
law and
In Reitsma, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island did not directly
address Pascoag Reservoir & Dam's takings claim; however, the court
implied that Pascoag could allege no such claim.88 On the other hand,
the various state supreme courts that did directly confront this issue
disagree with the Reitsma court; they hold that a property owner whose
land has been adversely possessed by the state cannot bring a takings
claim after the prescriptive period for adverse possession has expired.89
The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the state does not need
83. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 222.
84. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
85. Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224; see Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205, 1212
(Alaska 1993); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. 1966); Stickney
v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592, 603 (Me. 2001); A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478
N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985).
86. See sources cited supra note 85.
87. See Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
88. See Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826, 837 (R.I. 2001)
("[E]ven assuming, without deciding, that the corporation and/or its predecessors in title
would have possessed viable just compensation ...

claims ...

such claims long ago

would have lapsed because ... of [the owners'] failure otherwise to interpose a timely
objection to the state's conduct before the prescriptive ten-year period expired.").
89. See Weidner, 860 P.2d at 1205; Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d
975 (Colo. 1984); Stephens, 407 S.W.2d at 711; Stickney, 770 A.2d at 592; Rogers v.
Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of
Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974); A.A.A. Invs., 478 N.E.2d at 773; City of Ashland
v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67
(Wash 1980).
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90
to compensate a property owner when it adversely possesses property.
The court held that once the prescriptive period for adverse possession
has terminated, the property owner no longer owns the property. 91 As a
result, the adverse possessor is merely maintaining its possession of the
property, not taking property.9 2 Thus, because the Ohio Supreme Court
did not view the state's adverse possession as "taking" property away
from the private property owner, the Takings Clause was never
triggered.93
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state's
prescriptive easement over a record owner's private property did not
trigger the Takings Clause, therefore requiring no just compensation to
be paid to the former landowner. 94 The court reasoned that the
prescriptive period for prescriptive easements requires a landowner to
bring a takings claim within that time period: "At the expiration of the
prescriptive period, the landowner's right to bring suit is extinguished,
effectively vesting property rights in the adverse user." 95 As a result, the
court concluded that a valid takings claim could only have been brought
before the termination of the prescriptive period.96 Many other state
supreme court decisions regarding this issue follow this same line of
reasoning to find that a takings claim may only be brought before the
97
period for adverse possession or prescriptive easement expires.

90. A.A.A. Invs., 478 N.E.2d at 775. Note that this decision was based on the
language of section 19 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which provides, in part:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public
welfare. When taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively
requiring its immediate seizure, or for the purpose of making or repairing roads,
which shall be open to the public, without charge, a compensation shall be
made to the owner, in money.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19.
91. A.A.A. Invs., 478 N.E.2d at 775.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See Weidner, 860 P.2d at 1212. Weidner involved a public road built in 1952
and reconstructed in 1968. Id. at 1207. A portion of this road built by the state passes
over privately-owned property for which there was a valid easement. Id.However, the
private property owner's claim for just compensation, brought in 1984, arose after the
state reconstructed the road in 1968, thereby moving the road about fifty yards south of
the original roadway. id.at 1208. The State contended that there was no valid takings
claim because the taking had passed the Statute of Limitations. Id.at 1208.
95. Id. at 1212.
96. Id.
97. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 983-85 (Colo. 1984)
(holding that a landowner whose land is subject to a state's adverse possession must
"prohibit such public use or make manifest his objection to it in order to preserve the
landowner's objection for purposes of a takings claim"); see also Commonwealth v.
Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711,712 (Ky. 1966). In Stephens, the court said:
[A]fter the running of the statute of limitation, the original owner is no longer
in a position to assert title to the property and [title] has effectively vested in
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As demonstrated by the decisions of other state courts, the District
Court of Rhode Island navigated new territory by concluding that a valid
takings claim could be brought even after the prescriptive period for
adverse possession/prescriptive easement has terminated. 98 Although the
District Court stands nearly alone in its reasoning and analysis, 99 it has
shone a bright light on this issue, and the Pascoag decision has great
potential to influence many other courts confronted with this debate.
In Pascoag, the District Court of Rhode Island confronted each of
the state court opinions that held a private property owner was precluded
from bringing a takings claim after the prescriptive period for adverse
possession has terminated, and analyzed why those opinions were
incorrectly decided.' 00
First, the court recognized that a state and/or government entity is
inherently different from a private individual engaged in the act of
adverse possession.' 0 The government is always bound by the Takings
the adverse possessor. Thus ... since the original owner has lost his claim of
title, the state is no longer taking his property.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592, 603 (Me. 2001)
(holding that the private landowner should have brought his takings claim where the
municipality had acquired a prescriptive easement before the prescriptive period had
expired); Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ("Unlike
eminent domain ... the original owner of the property over which the prescriptive
easement in question runs has long since forfeited his right to demand payment for the
easement over his property."); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d
93, 96 (Neb. 1974) ("Adverse possession.., whether by the State or by an individual,
does not diminish nor destroy the owner's rights at any time during the running of the
statutory period of limitation. The statute of limitations, however, requires the owner to
exercise his rights within the 10-year time period."); City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543
P.2d 41, 43 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the Takings Clause does not prohibit
adverse possession by the State); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70 (Wash.
1980) ("A 10-year period of time, however, together with the requisite elements of
adverse possession would, in a case such as this, have vested the Port with a prescriptive
avigation right in plaintiffs' property. That avigation easement, if prescriptively
acquired, would not be compensable.").
98. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
99. There is one other source of authority that holds that a state that adversely
possesses property triggers the Takings Clause. See Johnson III v. City of Mt. Pleasant,
713 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). In Johnson, a municipality acquired title to
property by adverse possession. Id. at 663. Neither plaintiffs nor their predecessors in
title alleged a takings claim. Id. at 664. However, the court stated that "the adverse
possession of the property enclosed by the fence under claim of ownership amounts to a
taking within the provisions of Article 1 Section 21 [of the Tennessee Constitution] and
thus plaintiffs and their predecessors were bound to have redress if they sought it." Id.
100. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 223-24
(criticizing Weidner, 860 P.2d 1205; Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975; Stephens, 407 S.W.2d
711; Stickney, 770 A.2d 592; Rogers, 754 So. 2d 1267; Dunnick, 215 N.W.2d 93; A.A.A.
Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 1985); City of Ashland, 543 P.2d 41;
Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001); Petersen v. Port of
Seattle, 618 P.2d 67 (Wash. 1980)).
101. Id. at 225.
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Clause of the United States Constitution, which specifically prohibits the

state from taking property without just compensation,' 0 2 whereas a
private individual is not so bound.10 3 There are no qualifications on the
language of the Takings Clause; the plain language of the Fifth
Amendment mandates a state to pay compensation for taking private
property, no matter how that property is taken. 0 4 The court recognized
that the Takings Clause was designed "to protect private individuals from
excessive government intrusion on their property rights."' 1 5 If the State
of Rhode Island had chosen to acquire title to the easement over

Pascoag's property by exercising its eminent domain power, the State
would have been required to compensate Pascoag.

10 6

If Rhode Island

acquired an easement over Pascoag's property by legislative action, the
State would need to compensate the owner. 0 7 If the Rhode Island
legislature imposed regulations upon Pascoag's property that permitted
the public to
use its property unfettered, just compensation would have
8
0

been due.'
Rhode Island's action of acquiring title to portions of Pascoag's
property by adverse possession is no different. The government cannot
escape the bounds of the Takings Clause merely because it takes
property by a means other than eminent domain or land-use regulation.
Because the State engaged in a permanent physical occupation of
Pascoag's property, the State's action of acquiring portions of Pascoag's
land by adverse possession must essentially be likened to eminent
domain. 0 9 A state must abide by the terms of the United States
Constitution, and the Constitution mandates that the government provide
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
103. See Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
104. See id.
105. Id.; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825, 835 n.6 (1987).
106. See Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 225. In Nollan, the Court stated:
To say that the appropriation of a public easement across a landowner's
premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest but rather. . . 'a
mere restriction on its use' is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all
their ordinary meaning. Indeed, one of the principal uses of the eminent
domain power is to assure that the government be able to require conveyance of
just such interest, so long as it pays for them.
Nollan, 438 U.S. at 831 (citation omitted).
107. See Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 225. In Nollan, the Court reasoned that because
an "uncompensated conveyance of the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, the question becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a condition for
issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome." 438 U.S. at 834-47. The Court also stated
that regulation of land use is not a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state
interests. Id. at 837.
108. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 225; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
109. Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 226; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 512
U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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just compensation for taking property, no matter how that property is
taken." 0 Thus, although a state may validly acquire property by adverse
possession, just like any private individual, the state, unlike a private
individual, must provide just compensation because it is bound by the
Takings Clause."'
The second reason why the Pascoagcourt held that the state courts
incorrectly interpreted the Takings Clause in its application to a state
acquiring property by adverse possession is based on a common sense
analysis of what, in reality, is actually happening in adverse possession
cases."l 2 The state supreme court decisions held that a private property
owner was entitled to bring a valid takings claim prior to the running of
the prescriptive period for adverse possession/prescriptive easement, but
was precluded from bringing such a claim after the period had run." 3
The Pascoag court determined that the state courts' analyses were
incorrect because they misunderstood when the taking occurs in cases
involving adverse possession."14
The Pascoagcourt reasoned that the taking does not occur until the
prescriptive period for adverse possession/prescriptive easement is
complete.1 15 Until that time, the government has no legally recognizable
property interest in the land. 1 6 The only causes of action available to a
property owner prior to the termination of the prescriptive period are
actions of trespass" 7 and ejectment." 18 The property owner cannot bring
a takings claim while the prescriptive period is still running because the
adverse possessor does not gain legal title to the property until the period
is complete. 1 9 Thus, in Pascoag,Pascoag had no takings claim against
Rhode Island prior to the end of the prescriptive period. 120 As a result,
110. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 224.
113. Id.; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
114. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
115. Id. (stating that the property interest is not acquired by the government until the
adverse possession and prescriptive period has been completed).
116. Id.
117. Id. ("Under the trespass claim, the record owner could seek damages for the
trespass.").
118. Id. ("Under the ejectment claim, the record owner could stop the adverse
possession clock from running and enjoin the putative adverse possessor from continued
possession of the property.").
119. Id. The Pascoag court recognized that if a property owner was barred from
bringing a takings claim after the adverse possession clock has run, the property owner
would be forced into a "Catch-22" situation. Id. "He or she had no takings claim prior to
the completion of the adverse possession prescription period, but would be similarly
barred from having a takings claim after the period was completed." Id. The Pascoag
court did not want to sanction such an absurd result. Id.
120. Id.

2003]THE I NTERPLAY

BETWEEN PROPERTY LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw673

Pascoag could have brought a valid takings claim only after the State
adversely possessed its property.12'
The third reason why the Pascoag court held that the state courts
misinterpreted the Takings Clause and its application to adverse
possession is that the state courts' reliance upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Texaco v. Short122 was misplaced. 123 Many of the state
supreme court decisions relied upon Texaco for the proposition that a
124
state's adverse possession does not trigger the Takings Clause.
Texaco, however, "has nothing to do with adverse possession or
125
prescription by the state."'
In Texaco, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
Indiana's Mineral Lapse Act, which effectively extinguished all unused
property interests in minerals and reverted those unused interests to the
126
owner of the land from which those mineral interests were carved.
Appellants' mineral interests automatically lapsed because they did not
use their mineral interests for twenty years.127 Appellants challenged the
Act, claiming that it resulted in a taking in violation of the Fifth and
28
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court ruled that such a lapse in mineral rights does
not trigger the Takings Clause. 129 The Court determined that mineral
rights can be abandoned, and that after abandonment the former owner
has no claim for just compensation. 30 The Court stressed: "It is the
owner's failure to make any use of the property-and not the action of
121. Although Pascoag Reservoir & Dam had a valid takings claim against the State
of Rhode Island after the State adversely possessed its property and gained an easement,
Pascoag ultimately lost the case. Id.at 227-28. Pascoag's claim was barred either by the
statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of laches because Pascoag and its
predecessors in title "sat idly by and waited for twenty-six years after the cause of action
for just compensation accrued .. " Id.
122. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
123. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 224
124. Id.; see, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 983-84 (Colo.
1984); A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985); Reitsma v.
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.I. 2001).
125. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
126. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518. The Act provides:
Any interest in coal, oil and gas, and other minerals, shall, if unused for a
period of 20 years, be extinguished, unless a statement of claim is filed in
accordance with section five hereof [sic], and the ownership shall revert to the
then owner of the interest out of which it was carved.
Id. at 519 n.3 (citing IND. CODE § 32-5-11-1 (1976)).
127. Id. at 521-22. "[l]f the statute is valid, appellants' mineral interests have lapsed
because of their failure to produce minerals, pay taxes, or file a statement of claim within
the statutory period." Id. at 522.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id.
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of the property right; there is no 'taking'
the State-that causes the lapse
' 31
that requires compensation."'
Several state supreme courts applied Texaco's propositions in
holding that a state does not trigger the Takings Clause when it adversely
The Texaco decision, however, is not
possesses property.' 32
applicable.' 3 3 In Texaco, the statute allowed any mineral rights to be
abandoned.134 Land, however, cannot be abandoned.

35

Furthermore,

what was transpiring in Texaco was very different than what transpires
when the state adversely possesses property. 136 The reversion of the
137
mineral interests in Texaco occurred between two private individuals.
Because no government actor was involved in the extinguishment and
reversion of mineral rights, the Takings Clause was not triggered.,3 8 In
contrast, when the state adversely possesses private property, "the State
assumes title... allowing the public to permanently physically occupy
the record owner's land to effectuate a public easement on a man-made
reservoir ... . 139 Because it is the state that is gaining title to private
property, rather than a private individual, the Takings Clause is
triggered. 140 As a result, Texaco does not stand in the way of a private
property owner's valid takings claim. 141
The Pascoag court gives a thorough analysis why a state should
compensate a property owner when it adversely possesses his or her
property. 42 Not only does the court give solid reasoning to refute the

Id.
See Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.I. 2001) (citing
Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530) ("(T]his Court has never required the State to compensate the
owner for the consequences of his own neglect."); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 984-85 (Colo. 1984). In Flickinger, the court stated:
This case is not analytically distinguishable from Texaco, Inc..... The effect
of section 43-2-201(1)(c) is simply to require an owner desirous of retaining his
interest in property that he knows is subjected to continuous public use to
prohibit such public use or to make manifest his objection to it. The failure of
the Flickingers to comply with these statutory conditions resulted in the loss of
their interest in the road as a private road ...with the result that the application
of section 43-2-201(1)(c) to the road did not constitute a governmental taking
for which compensation was required.
see also A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985).
Id.;
133. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 225 (D.
R.I. 2002).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id
141. Id.
142. Id.
131.

132.
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conclusions of the various state supreme courts that held that the Takings
Clause is not triggered after the prescriptive period for adverse
possession has run, but it also bases its conclusion on the inherent
difference between a government entity, which is always subject to the
United States Constitution, and a private individual. 143 Although the
Pascoag court stands nearly alone in holding that the Takings Clause is
triggered when a state adversely possesses property, 144 its logical analysis
has great potential to influence future decisions regarding this current
debate. Hopefully, courts that are confronted with this issue in the future
will realize the inequity that will result to property owners if they are not
compensated when the state takes their property by adverse possession.
IV.

Conclusion

Currently, courts across the nation disagree over whether a state that
acquires property by adverse possession or prescriptive easement must
compensate the property owner because it triggers the Takings Clause of
the United States Constitution. Many state supreme courts hold that the
state does not need to compensate the property owner for adversely
possessing property after the prescriptive period has run, 14 5 while the
District Court of Rhode Island recently held that the state must
compensate the record owner, even after the prescriptive period has run,
because the state certainly does take property when it engages in adverse
possession. 146 Despite the fact that the District Court of Rhode Island
nearly stands alone in its analysis, it provides the proper solution to the
current debate because it is founded on principles of practicality, equity,
and logic.
Courts that will be confronted with this issue in the future should
realize that the government is not a private individual. The United States
Constitution recognizes this in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which requires the government to compensate property

143. Id. ("The government is not like another private individual, and the Constitution
through the Takings Clause recognizes that distinction.").
144. See also Johnson III v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1985); supra note 99 and accompanying text.
145. See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711
(Ky. 1966); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592 (Me. 2001); Rogers v. Marlin, 754
So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215
N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974); A.A.A. lnvs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 1985);
City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Reitsma v. Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67
(Wash. 1980).
146.

Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206.
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owners when taking their property for public use. 147 Acquiring property
through adverse possession is no exception. The state, as the adverse
possessor, is still eliminating the bundle of property rights that the
private property owner once had inherent in property ownership.
Furthermore, the state knows, or at least has easy access to the
information necessary to determine, who is the record holder of the
property it wishes to acquire. As a result, the state, as an adverse
possessor, should be held to a higher standard than a private person.
The District Court of Rhode Island is also correct in holding that the
takings claim does not arise until after the prescriptive period for adverse
It is not until the
possession/prescriptive easement has run.148
prescriptive period is complete that the state legally gains title to the
property. 149 Prior to the completion of the prescriptive period, the state is
merely trespassing on the owner's property. Thus, the state courts that
held that the property owner was precluded from bringing a takings
claim after the running of the prescriptive period were incorrect in their
analysis.
Equity and a common sense look at this current debate should guide
courts faced with this issue in the future to mandate a state to compensate
a private property owner whose property has been adversely possessed
by the state. Although this debate was centered in Rhode Island, this
same issue could arise in any state. There could be many instances in
which the state inadvertently "takes" property by adverse possession or
prescriptive easement, especially in circumstances involving highway
construction, where the public highway is unintentionally built upon
portions of private property, and boundary line disputes, where the
private landowner subsequently realizes50 that the state's neighboring
property encroaches upon his or her land.'
As has been shown, many jurisdictions mistakenly hold that the
government is no different from a private individual when it engages in
adverse possession. 151 Yet, this view deprives the United States
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
148. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
149. Id.
150. E.g., Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 977 (stating that private property was acquired by
the state by adverse possession because a road traversing the property had been adversely
used by the public for twenty consecutive years); Johnson III, 713 S.W.2d at 660 (stating
that the city made improvements to its sewage treatment plant and moved a fence so that
it occupied portions of the property in dispute).
151. See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 975;
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1966); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770
A.2d 592 (Me. 2001); Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Dunnick
v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974); A.A.A. Invs. v. City of
Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 1985); City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or.
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Constitution of all its significance and renders the Takings Clause
meaningless. The Pascoagcourt recognized this deficiency, and took the
first step towards correcting it. Hopefully, the Pascoagdecision will not
stand alone for long, as courts faced with this issue in the near future will
see the logic and equity that results from the District Court of Rhode
Island's analysis.

Ct. App. 1975); Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001);
Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67 (Wash. 1980).

